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OPINION OF THE COURT           
___________ 
 
VANASKIE, Circuit Judge. 
 
“A request for attorney‟s fees should not result in a 
second major litigation.”  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 
437 (1983).  Regrettably, requests for attorneys‟ fees in this 
protracted environmental clean-up case have resulted not only 
in a second major litigation, but a third as well.  An earlier 
multi-million dollar fee award previously brought before us 
was vacated and remanded for additional review by the 
District Court.  Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. 
(ICO II), 426 F.3d 694 (3d Cir. 2005).  We are now 
confronted with a challenge to another multi-million dollar 
award.  This latest appeal calls upon us to decide whether 
offers of judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 68 may be 
made in the context of attorney‟s fee disputes under the fee-
shifting provisions of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901, et seq.  We are 
also called upon once again to determine whether the fee 
award is excessive.  Because we conclude that Rule 68 offers 
of judgment may be made in this context, we will reverse the 
District Court‟s declaration that the offers of judgment in this 
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case are null and void as well as its decision to bar any further 
offers of judgment.  And, while we uphold as not clearly 
erroneous the District Court‟s decisions with respect to the 
appropriate hourly rates in this case, we are unable to sustain 
its conclusions with respect to the number of hours claimed 
by counsel because the District Court‟s findings lack 
sufficient explanation.  Accordingly, we will vacate the fee 
award and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
 Mutual Chemical Company of America (“Mutual”) 
operated a chrome manufacturing plant in Jersey City, New 
Jersey from 1895 to 1954.  During that time, the company 
deposited approximately 1.5 million tons of industrial waste 
residue containing hexavalent chromium into wetlands along 
the Hackensack River.  (Joint Appendix [“J.A.”] 1082-83.)  In 
1954, Allied Corporation purchased the plant and ended the 
dumping.  Allied Corporation was succeeded by AlliedSignal, 
Inc., and later by Honeywell International, Inc. 
(“Honeywell”).  Although the dumping stopped, the 
contaminated area was not cleaned up. 
 
 In 1995, the Interfaith Community Organization and 
five residents of the nearby community (collectively, “ICO”), 
represented by the Washington, D.C. law firm of Terris, 
Pravlik & Millian, LLP (“Terris”), filed the original suit 
against AlliedSignal, then the owner of the site, seeking the 
cleanup of a contaminated area designated “Study Area 7.”  
ICO sued AlliedSignal under the citizen suit provision of 
RCRA, which allows individuals to bring a civil action 
against any person “who has contributed or who is 
contributing to the past or present handling, storage, 
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treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or 
hazardous waste which may present an imminent and 
substantial endangerment to health or the environment . . . .”  
42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B).  
 
 The District Court entered judgment for ICO in 2003, 
ordering Honeywell (which had succeeded AlliedSignal) to 
clean up Study Area 7.  Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell 
Int’l Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 796, 802 (D.N.J. 2003).  This Court 
affirmed.  See 399 F.3d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 
In 2004, the District Court awarded ICO more than 
$4.5 million in fees and expenses for litigating the 1995 
action, and also required Honeywell to pay the future fees and 
costs incurred by ICO in monitoring Honeywell‟s cleanup.  
Interfaith Cmty. Org. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. (ICO I), 336 F. 
Supp. 2d 370, 403-04 (D.N.J. 2004).  We affirmed in part and 
vacated in part.  ICO II, 426 F.3d 694, (3d Cir. 2005).  
Specifically, we sustained as not clearly erroneous the District 
Court‟s decision with respect to the hourly rates sought by 
ICO‟s counsel, id. at 707-10, but rejected as inadequate the 
District Court‟s review of the hours for which compensation 
was claimed.  Id. at 711-14.  Accordingly, we vacated the fee 
award and remanded for further proceedings. 
 
 In 2005, Hackensack Riverkeeper (“Riverkeeper”), 
also represented by Terris, filed companion cases against 
Honeywell stemming from the same contamination but 
relating to areas adjacent to Study Area 7, designated as 
“Study Area 5” and “Study Area 6.”  (J.A. 1140.)  The parties 
entered into a number of consent decrees in which Honeywell 
conceded responsibility, and agreed to remediate the 
additional contaminated sites.  As part of the consent decrees, 
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Honeywell also agreed to pay $5 million in fees and costs for 
the expenses incurred prior to the decrees, and to pay 
“reasonable” future fees and expenses incurred in connection 
with monitoring Honeywell‟s remediation efforts.  (J.A. 334-
35.) 
 
 Initially, the parties were able to reach agreement on 
fees and expenses.  Beginning in the fall of 2009, however, 
Honeywell, on the one hand, and ICO and Riverkeeper 
(collectively, “Appellees”) on the other, failed to reach 
agreement with respect to the fees sought for monitoring 
Honeywell‟s work.   
 
Terris subsequently filed two separate fee applications, 
totaling more than $700,000, for its monitoring work 
performed in 2009 and the first half of 2010 in connection 
with the 1995 case.  Terris filed a separate application, 
seeking almost $2.5 million, for work performed on the 2005 
litigation.  Honeywell filed objections to the fee applications.  
Specifically, Honeywell renewed its previously-rejected 
arguments that the forum rate rule should be applied so that 
the hourly rates sought by Terris should be based upon the 
rates charged by New Jersey lawyers as opposed to 
Washington, D.C. lawyers, and that, even if D.C. rates were 
used, Appellees applied the wrong method for calculating 
prevailing D.C. market rates.  In addition, Honeywell once 
again contested the reasonableness of the hours and expenses 
claimed by counsel.  Honeywell also served offers of 
judgment pursuant to Rule 68 for the disputed fees.  In 
response, Appellees asked the District Court to issue a 
declaratory judgment that Honeywell‟s Rule 68 offers are null 
and void in the context of RCRA citizen suits.   
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 On September 8, 2011, the District Court issued an 
opinion that substantially upheld the Appellees‟ fee request.  
First, the District Court once again ruled that the forum-rate 
rule need not be applied in this case so that Terris could be 
paid Washington, D.C. rates for work relating to a dispute in 
New Jersey.  Interfaith Cmty. Org.v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. 
(ICO III), 808 F. Supp. 2d 744, 749-50 (D.N.J. 2011).  
Second, the District Court evaluated two different methods 
for calculating prevailing D.C. market rates, and approved the 
method requested by Appellees.  Id. at 750-51.  Third, the 
District Court rejected most of the challenges to the 
reasonableness of the hours expended by Appellees‟ counsel.  
Id. at 751-55.  And, finally, the District Court held that Rule 
68 offers of judgment cannot be made in citizen suits filed 
under RCRA, concluding that application of Rule 68 to 
RCRA citizen suits would violate the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072, by discouraging the very citizen suits that 
Congress intended to promote.  Id.  This appeal followed. 
 
II.  Discussion 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 
6972(a), the citizen suit provision of RCRA, and we have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We “review 
the legal interpretation of procedural rules de novo.”  United 
Auto. Workers Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dep’t v. Metro Auto Ctr., 
501 F.3d 283, 286 (3d Cir. 2007).  The standard the district 
court should “apply in calculating a fee award is a legal 
question subject to plenary review,”  Evans v. Port Auth. of 
N.Y. & N.J., 273 F.3d 346, 358 (3d Cir. 2001), but “[t]he 
determination of the appropriate billing rate is a factual 
finding which [this Court] review[s] for clear error.”  ICO II, 
426 F.3d at 709.  Finally, the amount of a fee award is within 
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the district court‟s discretion, and we will not disturb the 
district court‟s “determination of . . . the number of hours 
reasonably expended absent clear error.”  Evans, 273 F.3d at 
358.    
 
A. Rule 68 Offers of Judgment 
 
 We must first decide whether offers of judgment made 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 apply to 
attorney‟s fee disputes brought under the citizen suit 
provision of RCRA.  As the Supreme Court has instructed, 
“[w]e give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain 
meaning, and generally with them as with a statute, [w]hen 
we find the terms unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete.”  
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Group, 493 U.S. 120, 
123 (1989) (quotation marks omitted).  Thus, we begin, as we 
must, with the text of the rule.  See United States v. Gonzales, 
520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997).   
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 provides, in 
pertinent part: 
 
(a) Making an Offer; Judgment on an 
Accepted Offer.  At least 14 days before the 
date set for trial, a party defending a claim may 
serve on an opposing party an offer to allow 
judgment on specified terms, with the costs then 
accrued. . . .  
 
. . . .  
 
(c) Offer After Liability is Determined. When 
one party‟s liability to another has been 
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determined but the extent of liability remains to 
be determined by further proceedings, the party 
held liable may make an offer of judgment. . . .  
 
(d) Paying Costs After an Unaccepted Offer.  
If the judgment that the offeree finally obtains is 
not more favorable than the unaccepted offer, 
the offeree must pay the costs incurred after the 
offer was made. 
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a), (c)-(d) 
 
 Rule 68 does not exempt from its purview any type of 
civil action.  See 12 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice 
& Procedure § 3001.1 (2d ed. 1987).  Moreover, Rule 1 of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules apply to 
“all suits of a civil nature,” unless exempted by Rule 81.  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 1.  Rule 81, in turn, does not set forth any 
restrictions on Rule 68‟s applicability to citizen suits under 
RCRA, or to suits seeking equitable relief generally.  Thus, 
by its plain terms, Rule 68 is applicable to RCRA citizen 
suits. 
 
The District Court, however, held that Rule 68 is so 
incompatible with Congress‟ purpose in enacting RCRA that 
its application to cases brought under § 6972 would violate 
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072.  The Rules 
Enabling Act gives the Supreme Court the power to 
“prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of 
evidence for cases in the United States district courts . . . and 
the courts of appeals,” provided that “such rules [do] not 
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”  § 2072(a)-
(b).  Thus, if applying Rule 68 to § 6972 citizen suits abridges 
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or modifies a substantive right, then Rule 68 offers are void in 
this context notwithstanding the plain meaning of the rule.   
 
A rule of procedure does not run afoul of this statutory 
limitation merely because it “affects a litigant‟s substantive 
rights; most procedural rules do.”  Shady Grove Orthopedic 
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 
(2010) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).  As Justice Scalia 
elaborated: “What matters is what the rule itself regulates: If 
it governs only „the manner and the means‟ by which the 
litigants‟ rights are „enforced,‟ it is valid; if it alters „the rules 
of decision by which [the] court will adjudicate [those] 
rights,‟ it is not.”  Id. (quoting Mississippi Pub’g Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 446 (1946)). 
 
Applying the criterion that a rule of procedure 
impermissibly “abridge[s], enlarge[s], or modif[ies] [a] 
substantive right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), only if it alters the 
rules for adjudicating a litigant‟s rights, we readily conclude 
that application of Rule 68 in the specific context of this case 
does not violate the Rules Enabling Act.  No rule of decision 
governing the adjudication of the attorney‟s fee dispute that is 
the subject of Honeywell‟s offers of judgment is affected by 
application of Rule 68.  The amount of the fee to be awarded 
remains governed by the same rules of decision regardless of 
the interposition of an offer of judgment.  At best, the only 
impact that Rule 68 has on the ultimate outcome of the 
attorney‟s fee dispute is to require Appellees to bear their 
post-offer costs, including counsel fees, if the fee award is 
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less favorable than the offer of judgment.
1
  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
68(d); Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1985).
2
 
 
In light of Rule 68‟s laudatory purpose of facilitating 
settlement, Delta Airlines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 
(1981), the requirement that a plaintiff bear the fees incurred 
after it rejects an offer of judgment simply cannot be said to 
abridge some substantive right.  In this regard, fees incurred 
                                              
1
 Presumably, the only post-offer fees that may have to 
be borne by a plaintiff in the context presented here would be 
for time expended to continue to litigate the attorney‟s fee 
dispute.  In this context, therefore, the plaintiff is presented 
with the classic risk/reward consideration in evaluating any 
settlement offer: is it probable that continuation of the 
litigation will achieve an outcome that is worth more than the 
offer plus the costs incurred after the offer is received. 
 
2
 Marek held that where a statute includes attorney‟s 
fees within the term “costs,” such as 42 U.S.C. § 1988 does, 
“a defendant is not liable for the post-offer attorney fees of a 
rejecting offeree who obtains a judgment not more favorable 
than the offer.”  13 J. Moore, Moore‟s Federal Practice § 
68.08[4][a] (3d ed. 2011).  The citizen suit provision of 
RCRA provides that “[t]he court . . . may award costs of 
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness 
fees) to the prevailing or substantially prevailing party, 
whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate.”  
42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).  Thus, under Marek, Appellees could 
not recover post-offer fees if the amount ultimately awarded 
to them was less than the corresponding offer of judgment. 
 
13 
 
after a party rejects an offer of judgment and recovers less 
than the offer are properly viewed as being unreasonable. 
 
 The District Court, relying upon Public Interest 
Research Group of New Jersey v. Struthers-Dunn, Inc., Civ. 
A. No. 87-1773, 1988 WL 147639 (D.N.J. Aug. 16, 1988), 
reasoned that Rule 68 offers would discourage citizens from 
bringing suit and firms from accepting the cases, because 
there is no possibility for monetary relief in citizen suits and, 
therefore, the only source of compensation for law firms 
representing plaintiffs in these cases comes in the form of an 
award of attorney‟s fees.  ICO III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 756-57.  
The impact on a decision to pursue litigation, however, has 
nothing to do with whether the offer of judgment rule 
abridges or modifies some substantive right.  It may very well 
be that a Rule 68 offer of judgment in the context of a RCRA 
attorney‟s fee dispute will  require a plaintiff to make a hard 
choice between accepting what has been offered versus 
adjudicating the issues that are in dispute in such a case -- the 
appropriate hourly rate and the reasonableness of the hours 
expended.  That Appellees may feel compelled to take less 
than the amount to which they believe they are entitled, 
however, has nothing at all to do with the determination of 
the appropriate hourly rate and the reasonableness of the 
hours expended before the offer of judgment was made.  
Settlement offers often present difficult choices for a plaintiff, 
but that fact neither abridges nor modifies the substantive 
rights at issue.  Speculation as to the potential “chilling” 
effect of allowing Rule 68 offers of judgment in citizen suits 
under RCRA, advanced in Struthers-Dunn and embraced by 
the District Court in this case, is simply irrelevant to the 
pertinent inquiry: whether the rules of decision are altered by 
the offer of judgment.   
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 The Supreme Court has not considered Rule 68‟s 
impact on § 6972 citizen suits, but it has addressed the 
interaction between Rule 68 and the fee-shifting statute 
applicable to civil rights litigation, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.  See 
Marek, 473 U.S. 1.  While the majority opinion in Marek did 
not address whether application of Rule 68 in the context of 
civil rights litigation violated the Rules Enabling Act, its 
rationale is indeed instructive here.  In Marek, the Court 
considered whether post-offer of judgment “costs” to be 
borne by the plaintiff included plaintiff‟s attorney‟s fees when 
the ultimate recovery was less than the offer.  Id. at 3.  Stated 
otherwise, the issue in Marek was whether a plaintiff who  
received a verdict that was less than the offer of judgment 
could recover the fees incurred after the offer was made.  The 
plaintiffs in Marek argued that a recovery of less than the 
offer of judgment should not preclude an award of all counsel 
fees, including post-offer fees.  Id. at 4.  Much like the 
argument advanced by Appellees in this case, the Marek 
plaintiffs asserted that a different reading of Rule 68 would 
unfairly burden civil rights plaintiffs by discouraging 
attorneys from bringing meritorious claims at the risk of 
losing attorney fees.  Id.  Notwithstanding the strong policy 
arguments favoring the encouragement of suits to vindicate 
important constitutional rights, the Court applied the plain 
meaning of Rule 68 to foreclose recovery of post-offer fees.  
The Court concluded that the purpose of § 1988 (to encourage 
meritorious civil rights claims) was distinct from and 
compatible with the purpose of Rule 68 (to encourage 
settlement).  Id. at 11.  Thus, the Court held that “nothing . . . 
in the policies underlying § 1988 constitutes „the necessary 
clear expression of congressional intent‟ required „to exempt . 
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. . [the] statute from the operation of Rule 68.”  Id. at 11-12 
(citing Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700 (1979)). 
 
 Appellees argue that Marek is distinguishable because 
civil rights plaintiffs are often motivated by the potential for 
personal gain, in contrast to RCRA plaintiffs, who seek 
injunctive relief in furtherance of a purely public gain.
3
  
Although Appellees are correct that citizen plaintiffs suing 
under § 6972 cannot recover monetary damages, while 
plaintiffs in civil rights cases often can, they miss the point of 
the Court‟s analysis in Marek.  The Court sustained 
application of Rule 68 to civil rights cases even though it 
could chill the pursuit of litigation intended to vindicate 
important rights.  The Court concluded that, notwithstanding 
such potential, Rule 68 applied because the policies 
underlying Rule 68 and the fee shifting statute at issue there 
were compatible.
 4
   
                                              
3
  Private citizens bringing suit under 42 U.S.C. § 6972 
are limited to mandatory and prohibitory injunctive relief.  
Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 484 (1996).  
 
4
 Struthers-Dunn, 1988 WL 147639, on which the 
District Court relied to void the offers of judgment in this 
case, involved a Rule 68 offer of judgment in a somewhat 
different context than that presented here.  At issue in 
Struthers-Dunn was the defendant‟s liability, not only for 
attorney‟s fees, but also for monetary penalties for established 
violations of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seq.  
Any monetary penalties in the citizen suit under the Clean 
Water Act would be payable, not to the plaintiffs, but to the 
United States government.  Struthers–Dunn, 1988 WL 
147639, at *2.  Plaintiffs in Struthers-Dunn argued, as do 
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Appellees here, that application of Rule 68 served as a 
disincentive to bring a citizen suit, because plaintiffs did not 
have the possibility of receiving a monetary recovery and yet 
faced the specter of having to pay their own fees as well as 
defense costs, that could include defense counsel fees, if their 
ultimate recovery was less than the offer of judgment.  The 
District Court in Struthers-Dunn observed that “[n]ot even the 
most altruistic litigant can be expected to persevere under 
such circumstances.”  Id. at *4.  Struthers-Dunn, however, 
did not apply the correct criterion: whether Rule 68 changes 
the rule for adjudicating the parties‟ substantive rights.  
Significantly, applying this criterion, the Supreme Court has 
rejected every Rules Enabling Act challenge to a rule of 
procedure.  Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1432. Accordingly, the 
conclusion in Struthers-Dunn is fatally flawed.   
 
Struthers-Dunn is fatally flawed for another reason: its 
rationale rested on the unsound assumptions that plaintiffs 
could not recover any fees in the event that the ultimate 
recovery was less than the offer, see id. at *4 (“plaintiffs in 
the present action would . . . be precluded from an award of 
attorney‟s fees if they obtained a judgment less favorable than 
defendant‟s Rule 68 offer”), and that plaintiffs may have to 
pay defense counsel fees incurred after the offer was made. 
See id. at *4, n.7(“[I]f plaintiffs‟ incentive to vigorously 
prosecute this action would be chilled by the risk of having to 
pay defendant‟s costs, then plaintiffs‟ desire to pursue this 
litigation would be overcome from exposure at the prospect 
of being held accountable for defendants‟ attorney‟s fees.”)  
Contrary to the District Court‟s statement, a plaintiff who 
prevails on a fee-shifting claim is entitled to fees incurred 
before the offer of judgment.  See Marek, 473 U.S. at 4.  
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 The fact that only equitable relief is available under 
section 6972 does not alter this conclusion.  Courts have 
applied Rule 68 to suits seeking equitable relief despite 
arguments that doing so would discourage such claims.  See, 
e.g., NAACP v. Town of East Haven, 259 F.3d 113, 121 n.9 
(2d Cir. 2001) (“[N]othing in the Rule suggests that it applies 
only to cases seeking damages or other relief amenable to 
simple comparisons.”); Chathas v. Local 134 Int’l Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers, 233 F.3d 508, 522 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Rule 68 
offers are much more common in money cases than in equity 
cases, but nothing in the rule forbids its use in the latter type 
of case.”)  
                                                                                                     
Furthermore, where a plaintiff has prevailed on its underlying 
claim, a defendant in a fee-shifting case cannot recover 
attorney‟s fees under Rule 68 because in that circumstance it 
cannot be said that the plaintiff‟s action was “„frivolous, 
unreasonable or without foundation,‟” the general standard 
for awarding fees as part of “costs” to a prevailing defendant.  
See Le v. Univ. of Pennsylvania, 321 F.3d 403, 410-11 (3d 
Cir. 2003); see also Emerson Enterprises, LLC v. Kenneth 
Crosby New York, LLC, 781 F. Supp. 2d 166, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 
2011) (“For a defendant to qualify as a prevailing party [in a 
RCRA case], it „must show that the plaintiffs' claim was 
frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff[ ] 
continued to litigate after it clearly became so. . . .‟”).  Thus, 
the District Court‟s reliance upon Struthers-Dunn in the 
matter presently before us was misplaced.  Allowing offers of 
judgment in the context of this case does not expose 
Appellees to a complete denial of counsel fees or to payment 
of defense attorney‟s fees. 
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The fee shifting provision of section 6972 encourages 
plaintiffs to bring meritorious suits to enforce environmental 
laws, while Rule 68 encourages settlement of   civil suits.  See 
Delta Airlines, 450 U.S. at 352.  “There is nothing 
incompatible with these two objectives.”  Marek, 473 U.S. at 
4 (comparing purposes of §1988 with purposes of Rule 68).  
Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in the text of Rule 68 
suggests that such an exemption is warranted, and application 
of Rule 68 in the context presented here does not violate the 
Rules Enabling Act. 
 
Our Rule 68 inquiry is not yet complete, however.  
Appellees raise another challenge to Rule 68‟s applicability in 
this case, contending that the rule does not apply to 
proceedings after judgment has been rendered on liability.  
Appellees point to the text of the rule, which states that an 
offer of judgment must be made “at least 14 days before the 
date set for trial,” or, if “one party‟s liability to another has 
been determined but the extent of liability remains to be 
determined by further proceedings . . . it must be served 
within a reasonable time . . .  before the date set for a hearing 
to determine the extent of liability.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(a), 
(c).  Appellees interpret this language to mean that the rule 
only applies in two situations: first, before a trial; and, 
second, in a bifurcated proceeding after judgment has been 
rendered but before the extent of liability is determined.  
 
The first situation plainly does not apply here, and 
Appellees claim that this case does not fall within the second 
situation because attorney‟s fees cannot be regarded as part of 
Honeywell‟s liability.  Specifically, Appellees assert that the 
word “liability”—even within the phrase “extent of 
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liability”—does not encompass a dispute over attorney fees.  
To support this interpretation of the text, Appellees point to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54, which provides 
definitions of “judgment” and “costs.”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54.  
Because Rule 54 includes attorney fees within the definition 
of “costs,” Appellees argue that fees cannot also be included 
within the definition of “liability.”  (Appellee‟s Br. 55).  
Further, Appellees observe that “RCRA provides that „costs 
of litigation‟ include „reasonable attorney and expert witness 
fees,‟” and note that, under Marek, Rule 68 “costs” must also 
include attorney fees.  (Appellee‟s Br. 55-56).  Because 
“costs” include attorney fees for purposes of Rule 68, 
Appellees argue, attorney fees cannot also be part of 
“liability.” (Id.) 
 
Given the ordinary meaning of “liability,” see Black‟s 
Law Dictionary 997 (9th ed. 2009), the phrase “extent of 
liability” encompasses all legal responsibilities.    This appeal 
is evidence that the extent of Honeywell‟s liability has yet to 
be determined.   
 
This conclusion is consistent with our approach in 
Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Windall 
(PIRG), 51 F.3d 1179 (3d Cir. 1995), where we implicitly 
treated a Rule 68 offer made at the attorney‟s fee stage of 
litigation as valid.  In PIRG, we vacated a fee award and 
directed the district court to consider on remand whether the 
plaintiff reasonably continued to litigate the attorney‟s fee 
issue after refusing the defendant‟s Rule 68 offer.  51 F.3d at 
1190.  See also Sanchez v. Prudential Pizza, 709 F.3d 689, 
691 (7th Cir. 2013) (indicating that Rule 68 offers may 
include attorney‟s fees so long as the offer clearly states that 
it includes fees and costs). 
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Moreover, the policies underlying Rule 68 support this 
interpretation.  Rule 68 was created to “encourage the 
settlement of litigation.”  Delta Airlines, 450 U.S. at 352.  
The benefits of settlement are highest in the context of 
attorney fee disputes, which the Supreme Court has warned 
“should not result in a second major litigation.”  Hensley, 461 
U.S. at 437.  Incentive to settle is beneficial where, as here, 
the “litigation to resolve fee disputes has . . . taken on a life of 
its own.”  ICO III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 749.  As the District 
Court noted, “the amount of litigation engendered by the 
present fee dispute has probably cost as much as the contested 
amount.”  Id. at 748.  We are confident that encouragement to 
settle is warranted in this context.  Thus, because we believe 
that a Rule 68 offer in this context both comports with the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase “extent of liability” and is 
consistent with the fee-shifting provision of RCRA, we 
conclude that Rule 68 offers of judgment apply to disputes 
over attorney fees after liability has been determined. 
 
B. Forum-Rate Rule 
 
 We now turn our attention to the District Court‟s 
departure from the forum-rate rule.  The forum-rate rule holds 
that “in most cases, the relevant rate [for calculating attorney 
fees] is the prevailing rate in the forum of the litigation.”  ICO 
II, 426 F.3d at 705.  We have recognized two exceptions to 
the rule: “first, when the need for the special expertise of 
counsel from a distant district is shown; and, second, when 
local counsel are unwilling to handle the case.”  Id. (internal 
quotations omitted) (citing Report of the Third Circuit Task 
Force on Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237, 
261(1985)).  We sustained as not clearly erroneous the 
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District Court‟s decision in ICO I that the forum-rate rule 
should not be applied in this case.  See ICO II, 426 F.3d at 
707. 
 
Considering the issue once again in the instant 
litigation, the District Court found that Appellees 
demonstrated that “at least one, if not both, of the exceptions 
to the forum rate rule still apply.”  ICO III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 
749.  We review the District Court‟s finding that Appellees 
qualify for an exception to the forum-rate rule for clear error.  
ICO II, 426 F.3d at 705.  We will not disturb the District 
Court‟s findings as clearly erroneous unless we are “left with 
the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
committed.”  United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 133 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
The District Court found that the Appellees met the 
second exception to the forum-rate rule by demonstrating that 
local counsel were unwilling to handle the case.  In making 
this finding, the District Court relied on the affidavits of 
William Sheehan, Riverkeeper‟s executive director, and 
Edward Lloyd, the Evan M. Frankel Clinical Professor of 
Environmental Law at Columbia Law School and former 
director of the Rutgers University Environmental Law Clinic.  
Both affidavits support the District Court‟s finding that an 
extensive search for New Jersey counsel would have been 
futile.  Specifically, Sheehan‟s affidavit stated that, because 
Riverkeeper cannot afford to pay attorneys‟ fees, it relies on 
pro bono representation from the Rutgers Environmental Law 
Clinic and the Eastern Environmental Law Center in New 
Jersey in the environmental cases in which it participates.  
Sheehan explained it was his understanding that neither of 
those organizations would be able to take on larger, more 
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complicated cases such as the Study Areas 5 and 6 litigation.  
Sheehan further stated that “Riverkeeper has had a difficult 
time finding legal representation since it does not even have 
the resources to pay for fees and expenses even in small 
matters.”  (J.A. 714.)  Finally, Sheehan noted that he has 
personally had at least six meetings with local New Jersey 
counsel hoping to convince them to handle various cases for 
Riverkeeper on a pro bono basis, but to no avail.  
 
Likewise, Lloyd‟s affidavit also supports the District 
Court‟s finding that local counsel would have been unwilling 
to accept this case.  Lloyd stated: 
 
At the time that the Study Areas 5 
and 6 case was initiated in 2005, I 
was not aware of any New Jersey 
attorneys or law firms who would 
have been willing to assume the 
risks of litigating cases of this 
type, particularly without 
contemporaneous payment for 
their services and expenses. 
 
(J.A. 724.)   
 
Lloyd‟s affidavit in this case is very similar to the 
affidavit he filed in support of the fee application in ICO I, 
which we found persuasive when we upheld the District 
Court‟s departure from the forum-rate rule in that case.  See 
ICO II, 426 F.3d at 707.  The primary difference between the 
two affidavits is that in his affidavit supporting the fee 
application in this case, Lloyd reiterated that, at the time the 
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Study Areas 5 and 6 cases commenced, he was still unaware 
of local counsel willing to take on such a case. 
 
Notwithstanding our explicit reliance on Lloyd‟s prior 
affidavit in ICO II, Honeywell now argues that Appellees 
should have been required to conduct an individualized 
search for New Jersey counsel to handle the Study Area 5 and 
6 cases, even if Sheehan and Lloyd‟s experience in other 
similar cases taught them that no such counsel would have 
been available, because “[t]heir assumptions about the 
unavailability of counsel . . . do not demonstrate the absence 
of willing New Jersey counsel.”  (Appellant‟s Br. 28.)  We 
are not persuaded by this argument.  Our decision in ICO II 
explicitly credited Lloyd‟s testimony that he was unaware of 
willing local counsel, which he based on three decades of 
experience practicing environmental law in New Jersey.  
Here, the District Court relied on an additional affidavit that 
described the difficulty Riverkeeper faces in procuring 
counsel in even smaller cases due to its inability to pay 
attorneys‟ fees.  We once again find no clear error in the 
District Court‟s finding that Appellees demonstrated that 
local counsel are unwilling to handle the case.  Accordingly, 
we will affirm the departure from the forum-rate rule in this 
case.
5
  
 
C. The Laffey Matrix 
 
                                              
5
 In light of this determination, we need not address 
whether the District Court erred in finding that Appellees also 
met the first exception by demonstrating that local counsel 
did not have the “special expertise” necessary to represent 
ICO. 
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 Because we have sustained the District Court‟s 
decision to allow Terris to be compensated on the basis of 
Washington, D.C. rates, we must now determine whether the 
District Court erred in deciding what these rates are.  In this 
case, the District Court applied what is known as the “Laffey 
Matrix” for purposes of determining the appropriate hourly 
rates.
 6
  The Laffey Matrix “provides billing rates for 
attorneys in the Washington, D.C. market with various 
degrees of experience.”  ICO II, 426 F.3d at 708.  The 
original Laffey Matrix set forth the prevailing market rates 
from 1981-1982.  In 1989, the Laffey Matrix was updated to 
account for inflation.  See Trout v. Ball, 705 F. Supp. 705, 
709 n.10 (D.D.C. 1989) (approving updated Laffey Matrix).  
Since 1989, courts have approved various methods for 
updating the Laffey Matrix.  Compare Salazar v. District of 
Columbia, 123 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15 (D.D.C. 2011) (utilizing 
legal services component of the Consumer Price Index) with 
M.R.S. Enters., Inc. v. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 
05-1823, 2007 WL 950071, at *5 (D.D.C. 2007) (applying 
U.S. Attorney Office Matrix). 
 
The parties agree that the initial Laffey Matrix was a 
valid index of Washington, D.C. rates in 1982.  The parties 
further agree that an updated version of the Laffey Matrix, 
which accounts for the rise in prevailing rates based on 
inflation, would be a valid vehicle for determining the 
applicable hourly rates in the D.C. legal market today.  The 
                                              
6
 The Laffey Matrix was first utilized in Laffey v. Nw. 
Airlines, 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), aff’d, 746 F.2d 4 
(D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Save 
Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1525 
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
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parties disagree, however, about the proper method of 
updating the matrix.  Appellees favor the Legal Services 
Index (“LSI”) method, which accounts for “shifts in the 
consumer price index for legal services nationwide.”  ICO III, 
808 F. Supp. 2d at 750.  Honeywell prefers the U.S. Attorney 
Office (“USAO”) matrix, which “regularly updates the Laffey 
Matrix using the Consumer Price Index for the D.C. area.”  
(Appellant‟s Br. 31.)  These divergent methods result in very 
different prevailing rates.
7
  This Circuit has not specifically 
                                              
7
 The U.S. Attorney Matrix yields the following rates 
for 2010-2011: 
 
Years of Experience Hourly Rate 
20+ $475 
11-19 years $420 
8-10 years $335 
4-7 years $275 
1-3 years $230 
paralegals $135 
 
The LSI-updated Matrix yields the following rates for 
2010-2011: 
 
Years of Experience Hourly Rate 
20+ $709 
11-19 years $589 
8-10 years $522 
4-7 years $362 
1-3 years $293 
paralegals $161 
 
(JA 935-36.) 
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approved of either method, and both parties cite cases from 
the District of Columbia in support of their respective 
preferred methods. 
 
Appellees point to Salazar in support of their 
preference for the LSI index.  See Salazar, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 
15.  In that case, the District Court for the District of 
Columbia weighed the advantages and disadvantages of both 
the LSI index and the USAO matrix and determined that the 
LSI method “more accurately reflects the prevailing rates for 
legal services in the D.C. community.”8  Id.  In contrast, 
Honeywell cites multiple decisions applying the USAO 
matrix rather than the LSI-updated matrix.  See, e.g., Heller v. 
District of Columbia, No. 03-213, 2011 WL 6826278, at *8-
10 (D.D.C. 2011); Hayes v. D.C. Pub. Sch., 815 F. Supp. 2d 
134, 143 (D.D.C. 2011); M.R.S. Enters., Inc. v. Sheet Metal 
Workers’ Int’l Ass’n, No. 05-1823, 2007 WL 950071, at *5 
(D.D.C. 2007).    
 
                                                                                                     
 
8
 Specifically, the Salazar court explained that the 
advantage of the LSI index is that it is based on the “legal 
services component of the Consumer Price Index rather than 
the general CPI on which the [USAO matrix] is based.”  The 
Salazar court further explained that, although the advantage 
of the USAO Matrix is its reliance on data that is specific to 
the Washington, D.C. area, “the market for legal services in 
complex federal litigation in Washington, D.C. is not a local 
market.”  Id. at 14, 15 n.5 (citing affidavit of Michael 
Kavanaugh ¶ 15).  Thus, the Salazar court concluded that the 
LSI-updated Laffey Matrix was preferable to the USAO 
index.  Id. at 15. 
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The District Court, recognizing that “our Circuit has 
yet to specifically approve either version of updating the 
Laffey Matrix,” was persuaded by the methodology in 
Salazar.  ICO III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 750.  Furthermore, the 
District Court relied on this Court‟s prior opinion affirming 
use of the LSI methodology.  See ICO II, 426 F.3d at 709-10; 
ICO III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 750 (“[T]he Court will rely on the 
holding in the previous [ICO II].”).  In ICO II, we stated: 
 
[W]e do agree . . . that the simple 
fact that numerous courts in the 
District of Columbia have upheld 
the U.S. Attorney‟s Matrix as a 
reasonable measure of billing 
rates is not a sufficient ground for 
us to conclude that reliance by the 
District Court on [plaintiffs‟] 
updated Laffey Matrix was clearly 
erroneous. 
 
ICO II, 426 F.3d at 709-10. 
 
 We review the District Court‟s determination of the 
appropriate billing rate for clear error.  ICO II, 426 F.3d at 
709.  Clear error exists only where factual findings “are 
unsupported by substantial evidence, lack adequate 
evidentiary support in the record, are against the clear weight 
of the evidence or where the district court has 
misapprehended the weight of the evidence.”  United States v. 
6.45 Acres of Land, 409 F.3d 139, 145 n.10 (3d Cir. 2005).  
In light of our prior decision affirming the LSI methodology, 
as well as the District Court‟s assessment of the Salazar 
court‟s reasoning as persuasive, we will not now hold that it 
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was clear error to once again rely on the LSI method.  We 
thus affirm the District Court‟s use of the LSI-updated Laffey 
Matrix to determine the prevailing rates in the Washington, 
D.C. market. 
 
D. The Reasonableness of the Hours Expended 
 
 Although we have a sufficient record for sustaining the 
District Court‟s determinations as to the appropriate hourly 
rates, we cannot say the same with respect to the other 
component of the fee calculation: the reasonableness of the 
hours expended by Terris.  As we remarked in ICO II,  
 
[a] prevailing party is not 
automatically entitled to 
compensation for all the time its 
attorneys spent working on the 
case; rather, a court awarding fees 
must “decide whether the hours 
set out were reasonably expended 
for each of the particular purposes 
described and then exclude those 
that are excessive, redundant, or 
otherwise unnecessary.” 
 
426 F.3d 711 (quoting PIRG, 51 F.3d at 1188) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).   
 
The District Court “has „a positive and affirmative 
function in the fee fixing analysis, not merely a passive 
role.‟”  Id. at 713 (quoting Loughner v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 
260 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2001)).  And, where, as here, an 
objecting party has challenged specific types of work and 
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states why it is contended that the hours claimed are 
excessive, the reviewing court must support its findings with 
a sufficient articulation of its rationale to allow for 
meaningful appellate review.  Id. 
 
Here, Honeywell did identify specific categories of 
work for which the hours claimed were purportedly 
unreasonable.  Specifically, Honeywell objected to the 
following: 
 
 299 hours, amounting to $131,532 in fees, for lobbying 
activities.
9
 
 Approximately 2,400 hours, or nearly $1 million in 
fees, for identifying and supervising experts. 
 More than 1,300 hours, approximating $600,000, to 
conduct a few Rule 30(b)(6) depositions. 
 More than 2,600 hours, exceeding $400,000 in fees, 
for document or database management. 
 Over 1,300 hours, resulting in more than $400,000 in 
fees, for document review. 
 837 hours, totaling $271,824 in fees, for “pretrial 
work.” 
 331 hours, totaling more than $125,000, for 
remediation of one residential property. 
                                              
9
  Although acknowledging that it was not likely that 
such work “was „crucial to safeguard the interests asserted,” 
the District Court approved 75% of the time expended.  ICO 
III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (citing Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley 
Citizens’ Council for Clear Air, 478 U.S. 546 (1986)).  No 
explanation was given as to why this amount of time on a 
clearly collateral matter was reasonable. 
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 242 hours, amounting to more than $100,000 in fees, 
for financial assurances from Honeywell 
 578 hours, exceeding $400,000 in fees, for Bruce 
Terris‟s time overseeing the work of the other Terris 
partners. 
 Almost 2,300 hours, amounting to over $1 million in 
fees, for intra-office conferencing.
10
 
 Expert witness expenses totaling more than $1.3 
million. 
 
Although decrying the litigation tactics employed by 
Terris as “distasteful,” “aggressive,” and “unsavory,” id. at 
751, 753, the District Court nonetheless chose to “credit[] 
[Appellees‟] arguments . . . as to the reasonableness of the 
legal and expert fees, expenses and hours charged,” 
explaining that it “will not second guess the staffing decisions 
of either the Terris firms or its experts . . . .”  Id. at 754-55.  
This perfunctory statement does not allow for meaningful 
appellate court review.  As we said in ICO II, “where the 
opinion of the District Court „is so terse, vague, or conclusory 
that we have no basis to review it, we must vacate the fee-
award order and remand for further proceedings.”  426 F.3d 
at 713 (quoting Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 223 F.3d 
190, 196 (3d Cir. 2000)).  Accordingly, we must once again 
vacate the District Court‟s latest fee awards and remand for 
further proceedings.
11
 
                                              
10
  The District Court reduced the fees in this category 
by 10%, but gave no explanation as to why a 10% reduction 
was adequate.  ICO III, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 753.  
 
11
 We respectfully suggest that the District Court 
consider the appointment of a Special Master to review the 
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III. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court‟s ruling that Rule 68 offers of judgment are 
inapplicable in the context of environmental citizen suits 
brought under RCRA, direct that the previously made offers 
of judgment be reinstated, affirm the District Court‟s 
departure from the forum-rate rule because review of this 
issue is barred by collateral estoppel,  affirm the District 
Court‟s application of the LSI-updated Laffey Matrix, vacate 
the District Court‟s fee award, and remand the case for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
fee applications in these now-consolidated matters.  The fee 
requests present a daunting task to a busy District Court, 
which must handle a multitude of matters with limited 
resources.  A report from a Special Master, who could be 
compensated equally by both Honeywell and Appellees, may 
facilitate the District Court‟s requisite “thorough and 
searching analysis” of the law firm‟s billing records.  ICO II, 
426 F.3d at 711 (quoting Evans, 273 F.3d at 362).  We leave 
to the District Court‟s discretion, however, whether to enlist 
the services of a Special Master, as well as whether to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing on Honeywell‟s objections to 
the number of hours for which Terris claims compensation. 
